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DONATIONS OMNIUM BONORUM
ARTICLE 1497
WHO MAY OBJECT TO SUCH DONATIONS?

Article 1497 provdes that: "The donation inter vivos shall in
no case divest the donor of all his property; he must reserve for
himself enough for subsistence; if he does not do it, the donation
is null for the whole." This article was adopted from the Spanish
law. The.Spanish commentator Febrero states that the raison
d'6tre was public consideration.' The article did not appear
in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, but was adopted in 1825.
In reflecting upon the significance of the article at the time of its
adoption the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 said:
"We propose to re-establish this wise disposition which before
existed and which the code had abolished, wherefore we have
the article had been adopted
not learned," thus indicating that
2
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the
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protection
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for
Louisiana jurisprudence instances a various application of
this article. Insofar as the donor is concerned, his right to annul
such a donation has repeatedly been recognized.3 Furthermore,
1. II Febrero Novisimo (ed. by Tapia 1837) tit. IV, c. XXII, p. 462. ("La
razdn es porque ademds de quedarse el donante sin lo necesario para su
manutencion, se priva del derecho de testar, y se puede dar occas16n al
donatario para que maquine la muerte del donante con el fin de apoderarse
prontamente de sus bienes. Fuera de esto, y ademds del perjuicio que se causa
d las costumbres, no conviene en el orden p4blico que loe hombres sean
prddigos.") The reason is because, besides the fact that the donor remains
without the necessary means for his subsistence, he deprives himself of the
right of making a will and an occasion may be given to the donee to procure
the death of the donor in order to take possession of the estate. Besides this,
and besides the prejudice it causes to the mores, it is not convenient to the
public order that men be prodigious.
2. I Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (1937) 207. ("Nous proposons de
rdtablir cette sage' disposition, que existait ci-devant, et que le code avait
abolie, on ne volt pas pourquoi.")
3. Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845); Beaulieu v. Monin, 50 La.
Ann. 732, 23 So. 937 (1898); Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904);
Nunge v. Cegretto, 3 Or. App. 39 (La. App. 1905); Rocques v. Freeman, 125
La. 60, 51 So. 68 (1909); Jaco v. Jaco, 129 La. 621, 56 So. 615 (1911); Succession
of Suarez, 131 La. 500, 59 So. 916 (1912); Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671
(1913); Tucker v. Angell, 1 La. App. 577 (1925); Armand v. Armand, 8 La. App.
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the court decided that the donor was not estopped from annulling
a donation of realty which had passed to a third person by sale,
even though the purchaser had relied on the donor's assertion
that the donee had good title.4 A donation will be considered
void ab initio even if the donor has property left, provided that
such, residue is not enough for his subsistence.5 The right of the
donor to annul is as forceful between spouses as against strangers.6 Hence, a donation in consideration of marriage will be null
and void, if the donor does not reserve enough for his subsistence.7 Furthermore, a donation, the object of which was community property, was held null for the whole and not for only
half, where the action invoking Article 1497 was brought by the
survivor of the spouses," the survivor having been the original
donor.
Several times it has been said that it is the concern of the
state that one shall not pauperize himself by his gratuities.9 Yet,
however inconsistent with this thought, the right cannot be exercised by forced heirs while the donor is still living.'0 But on the
theory that such a donation is void ab initio and title has never
left the donor, the forced heirs have been permitted to annul
the donation after the death of the donor.1 Where, however,
forced heirs rightfully exercise this right, it will be fatal to an
annulment of the donation, if they fail to prove conclusively that
the donation divested the donor of all his property and that the
value of the property exceeds by one-half the value of the services, 1 2 for Article 1526 is a complete answer to Article 1497.'3
810 (1928); Carter v. Bolden, 13 La. App. 48, 127 So. 111 (1930); Kirby v. Kirby,
176 La. 1037, 147 So. 70 (1933).
4. Hearon v. Davis, 8 So.(2d) 787 (La. App. 1942). In such a situation,
however, the donee will be liable for any warranty deed demands made upon
him by the purchaser.
5. Kirby v. Kirby, 176 La. 1037, 147 So. 70 (1933); Heron v. Davis, 8 So.(2d)
787 (La. App. 1942). The determination as to whether the donor reserved
enough for his subsistence is made with reference to his circumstance at the
time of the donation, and'not at the time suit is brought.
6. Succession of Suarez, 131 La. 500, 59 So. 916 (1912); Kelly v. Kelly, 131
La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
7. Succession of Suarez, 131 La. 500, 59 So. 916 (1912).
8. Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904).
9. Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845); Despart v. Darambourg, 2
McCloin 5 (La. App. 1884); Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
10. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 180 La. 35, 156 So. 166 (1934).
11. Caraway v. LeBlanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1924); Litton v. Stephens, 187
La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1937).
12. Burk v. Burk, 7 Orl. App. 92 (La. App. 1909); Hersey v. Craig, 126 La.
824, 53 So. 17 (1910); Potts v. Potts, 142 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918).
13. Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888); Dopler v. Feigel,
40 La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106 (1888); Robinson v. Guedry, 181 So. 882 (La. App.
1938).
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Moreover, where there is a conveyance, purporting to be a sale,
but which is proved by a preponderance of evidence to have
been a donation, such a conveyance will fall under the ban of
Article 1497.14
It is definitely settled that the collateral heirs have no right
to annul a donation omnium bonorum, either during the life of
the donor or after his death.15
It is difficult to reconcile the jurisprudence on Article 1497
and its public policy philosophy. The court apparently proceeds
on the theory that it is to protect the public from the burden of
supporting the donor, that a donation omnium bonorum is null
ab initio; yet the right to annul the gift of all goods is denied to
all but the donor while the latter lives, thus defeating what the
article has been inaugurated to accomplish. The donor may
become a burden upon the public, but the article is inoperative
unless invoked by the donor. This seems repugnant to the spirit
of this law.
The court has gone further and has permitted the forced heirs
of the donor to annul such a donation after the death of the
donor., This position is also difficult to reconcile. If Article 1497
is for the protection of the public against those who pauperize
themselves by their gratuities, then those who are legally responsible for the support of the individual, including the state, should
be allowed to bring the action during the lifetime of the donor
if and only when they are called upon to support him. Certainly
no action by anyone should be allowed after the death of the
donor if the purpose of the aticle is to be carried out. If the
forced heirs have been prejudiced by the donation, they have
their remedy-reduction. Furthermore, if the case be that the
donation was in compensation of service, then they still may
reduce to the value of such service. By being allowed to annul
the donation after the donor's death, forced heirs are permitted
to circumvent positive laws delegating personal rights to the
donor. In short, the effect is to deny the donor the right of freely
allocating the disposable portion of his estate.
In this connection the jurisprudence grounds the annulment
on the theory that since the donation is void ab initio, title has
14. Armand v. Armand, 8 La. App. 810 (1928).
15. Scott v. Briscoe, 37 La. Ann. 178 (1885); Bernard v. Noel, 45 La. Ann.
1135, 13 So. 737 (1893); Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907);
Grandchampt v. Billis' Heirs, 121 La. 340, 46 So. 348 (1908); Succession of
Desina, 123 La. 468, 49 So. 23 (1909): Succession of Bradley, 8 La. App. 260
(1928).
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never left the donor; hence the forced heirs are merely asserting
their rights to what is actually vested in them at the moment of
the donor's death. The code article under discussion if adopted
for the purpose stated does not support this theory. The article
merely states that the donation shall be "null for the whole."
Assuming for the moment, however, that the donation is void
ab initio, it should then be an inevitable consequence that the
legal heirs of the most remote degree would have a right to annul
it. If title has never left the estate, and in consideration of the
fact that they have a right to claim an intestate succession in the
absence of closer heirs, they cannot be denied the right to assert
their claim. The effect of this would be astounding. Suppose a
widower who had lost his sons in this war donated all his property for the purpose of caring for the returning veterans. According to the ab initio theory, in such a situation, the legal heirs
would be able to annul the donation after the donor's death. This
construction would seem to be contrary to the purpose of the
article. It is submitted that the theory that the donation is void
ab initio is an erroneous interpretation of the article.
The case of Maxwell v. MaxweW held that the right to
invoke Article 1497 is personal to the donor and cannot be invoked
by the forced heirs while the donor lives. If this right be personal, then presumably it perishes with its owner, the donor.
As an analogy the treatment given to the right of the surviving
spouse to the marital portion allowed under Article 2382 might
be cited. The court has repeatedly held that this is a personal
and optional right, that the heirs do not and cannot receive this
right by inheritance, because all personal rights die with the
17
individual.
In the Succession of Turgeau,18 where a donation was sought
to be annuled the court said that the "attack after death of the
decujus is of a personal character, and that only forced heirs can
urge the ground to the extent of their ldgitime."'9 (Italics supplied.) The soundness of this notion should not be disparaged by
the fact that it was presented by way of dicta. A close examination of Article 1497 in relation to the articles on reduction is convincing that the remedy of forced heirs is reduction.
16.
17.
Rogge,
604, 39
18.
19.

180 La. 35, 156 So. 166 (1934).
Succession of Justus, 44 La. Ann. 721, 11 So. 95 (1892); Succession of
50 La. Ann. 1220, 23 So. 933 (1898) Succession of Kunemann, 115 La.
So. 702 (19,05); Succession of Bancker, 154 La. 77, 97 So. 321 (1923).
130 La. 650, 58 So. 497 (1912).
130 La. 650, 655, 58 So. 497, 499.
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Where public interest comes into conflict with personal rights,
the latter should yield. Since, therefore, it is the concern of the
public that an individual should not pauperize himself, he who
has donated all his goods should forfeit his personal right of annulment to those who are immediately affected by his act. Under
Article 229 of the Revised Civil Code, the children are bound to
maintain their father and mother and other ascendants, who are
in need. If it should be that a parent is in a state of destitution
because of having donated his property, is it not equitable, sound
and consistent with the public policy of this article that such heirs
should have the unquestionable right of annuling, then and there,
such a donation? Article 1497 contemplates this situation. The
article should not be emasculated by suspending its operation
until after the donor is dead-after the commission of the damage
against the public is completed.
The state should also have this right, if called upon to support
the donor. Conceding that the purpose of the article is for the
protection of the public, then the granting of this right to the
state or to those legally responsible for support of the donor
would be a complete fulfillment of this purpose, if granted during
his lifetime and only if support is necessary.
If any person is allowed to annul a donation omnium bonorum
during the life of the donor, certainly the benefits of the annulment should inure to the donor and not to anyone who should
annul the donation.
In consideration of the fact that Louisiana does not recognize
stare decisis and that the jurisprudence on this article is not too
definitive nor multiple in nature, the court might shift its present
position with regard to the rights of those concerned. Any of
those who are legally bound and are called upon to support the
donor, if the latter does not wish to exercise his right, should be
able to annul any donation omnium bonorum, during the "donor's
lifetime, and the effect of the annulment should restore title in
the donor. And conversely, no person whatsoever should be
entitled to exercise the right provided by Article 1497 after the
donor so divested has died, since forced heirs are fully protected
by their right to reduce any and all gifts.
JOSEPH M. SIMON

